

Regime Transition and Attitude toward Regime

The Latin American Gender Gap in Support for Democracy

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Gendered literature about the third wave of democracy suggests that women should be at least as supportive of democracy as their male counterparts since women have made tangible gains in new democratic states. For instance, the political representation of women by women (descriptive representation) in new democratic legislatures of the third wave is dramatically higher than representation of women by women during the prior authoritarian period.¹ Paradoxically, survey data from Latin America and Africa show that women are 5 percent and 7 percent, respectively, less likely than men to prefer democracy.² Moreover, Latin American data suggest that women, as a group, are more likely than men to reject democracy when democracy underperforms. Scholars posit that these gendered differences occur because 1) women are more risk-averse and significantly less likely than men to prefer the uncertainty of democracy; and 2) women are more likely than men to base their preference for democracy on the performance of the democratic regime.³

Assuming that these gendered differences come not from inherent characteristics of men and women but rather from something that each group uniquely experiences, what have these groups encountered or undergone to formulate such unique responses? Literature on women and democratization in Latin America suggests that the historical moment of the democratic transition is the likely antecedent from which these gendered differences arise.⁴ Moreover, Georgina Waylen argues that “a gendered analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America must begin by examining the terms of transition.”⁵ In short, the mode of the democratic transition conditions the effect that gender has on support for democracy. Thus, we argue that the gender gap in support for democracy is partly a function of the level of attachment that women, as a group, have for the democratic regime, and that this level of attachment is, at least in part, determined by the mode of democratic transition.

We evaluate the gender gap in democratic support by examining attitudes toward regime type in seventeen Latin American countries over four time periods (1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006). Building on the work of Michelle Saint-Germain concerning gender

and democratic transition, and the work of Terry Lynn Karl concerning modes of democratic transition (imposition, pact, reform, and revolution), we develop and test four models of how gender informs the attitude-toward-regime decision.⁶ We find that women in imposition-transition countries are most different from their male counterparts in the probability of a democratic preference, and in the manner in which they formulate this democratic preference. In contrast, women in reform-transition countries are most similar to their male counterparts in the probability of a democratic preference and the manner in which they formulate this democratic preference.

Explaining the Gender Gap in Attitude toward Regime

Initially, gender gap literature in political science focused on gender differences in voting behavior.⁷ In recent years, scholars have identified gender gaps in political participation,⁸ political knowledge,⁹ issue attitudes,¹⁰ and partisanship.¹¹ Although studies of gender differences in Latin America are less frequent, several have examined differences in the political attitudes of women and men in the areas of voting behavior,¹² land ownership,¹³ economic reform,¹⁴ work,¹⁵ and judicial systems.¹⁶

Given the rich literature on democratization in Latin America, the lack of a gendered analysis of the attitude-toward-regime question is a striking deficiency. This deficiency exists because many scholars frame the attitude-toward-regime discussion as a question of support for democracy, which presupposes that the selection of a choice other than support for democracy is a rejection of democracy. A choice of “no response,” for instance, is interpreted as a sign of disapproval. Researchers then connect gendered differences in the probability of a democratic preference to gender gaps in political knowledge, political efficacy, political engagement, education, economic resources, and political interest.¹⁷ But the non-selection of the democratic preference is an important piece to this puzzle. Non-selection does not indicate that women are more or less likely than men to reject democratic governance. The question is more complex and involves understanding the level of attachment (affect) that individuals have to the new democratic regime, and to the regime that preceded it.

Conventional research on the origin of attitudes toward a regime advances several factors, including political culture,¹⁸ capitalist development,¹⁹ the choices of political actors,²⁰ economic performance,²¹ and political learning.²² These regime-level explanations tend to minimize process-oriented mechanisms that are at work in the attitude-toward-regime choice, thereby minimizing the impact of gender on the attitude-toward-regime choice.²³ This article seeks to explain more fully the process by which the attitude-toward-regime decision is made.

Modeling Gendered Attitude toward Regime

Like all attitudes, attitude toward a regime is a function of affect and cognition. Gender differences in the mix of these two components may be responsible for at

least a part of the gender gap in the attitude-toward-regime choice. The nature and penetration of media coverage have major ramifications for gendered attitudes toward a political object.²⁴ Certainly, exposure to information has a major impact on cognition processes.²⁵ Scholars demonstrate a relationship between exposure to information and regime norm formation in both advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes.²⁶ If affect and cognition effects are easily separated, exposure to information influences the cognition dimension of the mixture, while women and men's differing orientations to the new democratic regime relate to the affect dimension. The "Separate Components" model of attitude toward regime is→

$$\textit{Attitude toward Regime} = \textit{Gender} + \textit{Exposure to Media} + \textit{Exposure to Media}^2$$

The Exposure to Media term accounts for the curvilinear relationship between attitude toward regime and exposure to media². Following Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, we argue that the effect of exposure to information on issue attitudes is generally curvilinear in new democracies, where a settled elite consensus about regime may not exist.²⁷ In societies where elites disagree on regime type, mid-level awareness persons are more susceptible to information effects than are highly aware or less aware persons.²⁸ This disagreement on regime is evident in that a minority, but not insignificant, group of Latin American elites continues to favor authoritarian governance.²⁹

There is no reason to believe that affect and cognition can be separated as neatly as modeled above. Saint-Germain suggests three conditions that may influence how women and men differ in how they view the new democratic regime: 1) the level of participation of women in the democratic transition; 2) the degree that women are engaged in the electoral process; and 3) the manner in which women adapt to new expectations and power structures of the post-transition period.³⁰ This means women's orientations toward their new democratic state should be oriented not only by the historical moment of the democratic transition, but also by the subsequent role that they as women play in the democratic consolidation process.³¹ In turn, information about women's successes and failures in the new democratic regime may influence women's attitude-toward-regime decisions more strongly than men's attitude-toward-regime decisions. The Information Model of gendered attitude toward regime is→

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Attitude toward Regime} = & \textit{Gender} + \textit{Exposure to Media} + \textit{Exposure to Media}^2 \\ & + \textit{Gender} * \textit{Exposure to Media} + \textit{Gender} * \textit{Exposure to Media}^2 \end{aligned}$$

Further, women's relationships with political parties at the time of and subsequent to the democratic transition may influence their engagement in the electoral process. Women's relationships with the political party system may condition the success of women in the new democratic environment.³² In cases where compromise between political parties shapes the transition, women's relationships with the political party system differentiates them from men in how they respond to

the attitude-toward-regime decision. This Party-Based Model of gendered attitude toward regime is→

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Attitude toward Regime} = & \textit{Gender} + \textit{Exposure to Media} + \textit{Exposure to Media}^2 \\ & + \textit{Relationship to Political Party} \\ & + \textit{Gender} * \textit{Relationship to Political Party} \end{aligned}$$

Adaptation to the new power structure also influences the relationships that men and women have with the new democracy. Women who are better equipped to participate in the politics of the new democracy should also be more supportive of democracy than women who are less equipped. Importantly, Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns, and Kay Schlozman show that political efficacy plays an important role in the gendered orientations of women and men toward politics.³³ Political efficacy relates to citizens' capacity to organize themselves and others for political action.³⁴ In situations where women have mobilized as political groups to engage the state, women's attitude-toward-regime decisions should be more strongly linked to political efficacy than men's decisions. The Political Efficacy Model of gendered attitude toward regime is→

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Attitude toward Regime} = & \textit{Gender} + \textit{Exposure to Media} + \textit{Exposure to Media}^2 \\ & + \textit{Political Efficacy} + \textit{Gender} * \textit{Political Efficacy} \end{aligned}$$

Regime Attitudes in Latin America

Latin American women are less likely than men to express a preference for democracy. This gender difference increased from 1997 to 2006. In 1997 the percentage of women who expressed a preference for democracy was only 1.5 percent lower than the percentage of men who expressed the same (62.6 to 64.1 percent).³⁵ By 2006 the percentage of women who expressed a preference for democracy was 5 percent less than the percentage of men who expressed the same (54.9 percent to 60.0 percent).

From the standpoint of descriptive representation, women have made advances in third wave Latin American democracies. The percentage of women in legislatures in the seventeen countries of this study increased from 10.5 percent in 1997 to 18.9 percent in 2006.³⁶ Scholars have produced a rich body of literature about women and representation in Latin America that generally shows that women, as a group, have made advances politically in new Latin American democracies.³⁷

Women have also made advances in income equality. In 1997 the annual per capita income of women in Latin America was only 37.4 percent the per capita income of men.³⁸ By 2006 women earned 48.9 percent the annual per capita income of men. Although part of the relative closing of the income gap between Latin American women and men can be attributed to the stagnation of male income during the economic downturn of 2000 to 2002, women made up some ground between 2003 and 2006. Accordingly, evidence indicates that women are making advances both politically and economically in third wave democracies.³⁹ Yet despite these gains, women are less likely to express a preference for democracy.

The Data and Measurement of Variables

The Latinobarometro survey is conducted annually by the *Latinobarómetro* Corporation of Santiago, Chile. We use the 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006 surveys to test the models presented in this article because these provide a useful cross-section and similar questions with which to form the independent variables of the prediction models. Each country-year survey was conducted door-to-door and contains survey responses for individuals in seventeen Latin America countries. The total sample size is 73,659. Age is the variable that we use to select the sample.⁴⁰ In short, we include all respondents who provided a substantive response to the age question. The surveys represent 100 percent of the populations in all countries, except Chile and Paraguay where the samples represent only urban populations in 1997, 2000, and 2003. Each country-level survey has a 3 percent margin of error.⁴¹

Dependent Variable: Attitude toward Regime

We obtain the dependent variable (Attitude toward Regime) from the following survey question and responses: Which of the following statements do you agree with most? 1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 2) In certain situations an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; 3) It does not matter to people like me whether we have a democratic government or a nondemocratic government.⁴² The percentage of Latin American respondents who favor democracy is 58.6 percent in 1997, 60.1 percent in 2000, 54.0 percent in 2003, and 57.4 percent in 2006. The percentage of respondents who favor democracy also varies by country.⁴³

The percentage of individuals who express an authoritarian preference is constant overtime. The percentage of individuals who sometimes prefer authoritarian governance is 17.6 percent in 1997, 17.4 percent in 2000, 17 percent in 2003, and 17.1 percent in 2006.⁴⁴ The stability of our data in the face of the 2000 to 2002 economic downturn is instructive and supports the idea that authoritarian attitudes are socially learned and not generally a function of economic conditions.⁴⁵ In addition, variation in ambivalence about regime type is concomitant with variation in democratic preference. The percentage of individuals who are ambivalent about regime type changes from 19.1 percent in 1997 to 22.5 percent in 2000, 29.0 percent in 2003, and 25.5 percent in 2006.⁴⁶

Gender and Attitude toward Regime

Gender is the primary explanatory factor in this study. Women account for 51.2 percent of our overall sample. Women are less likely than men to prefer democracy (56.7 percent to 60.7 percent) and more likely than men to be ambivalent about regime (26.3 percent to 21.8 percent). We contend that gendered differences in the ambivalent category are as important as gendered difference in democratic preference because the “nonsubstantive”

ambivalent response reflects an attitude.⁴⁷ Moreover, the data indicate that women are not more likely than men to reject democracy in favor of authoritarianism. Instead, women are more likely than men to become ambivalent about regime type when they abandon (but not fully reject) democracy.

Our finding is consistent with the findings of Carolyn Logan and Michael Bratton concerning support for democracy/authoritarianism/ambivalence in fifteen sub-Saharan African countries. Using 2003 Afrobarometer data, they find that women were less likely than men to have a democratic preference (61 percent to 67 percent), equally likely as men to have an authoritarian preference (13 percent to 14 percent) and more likely than men to be ambivalent (26 percent to 19 percent).⁴⁸ Logan and Bratton offer an alternative explanation to our affect-attachment explanation, ascribing the gender gaps in democratic and ambivalent preferences to greater risk-averse behavior among women in the African countries of their study.

Independent Variables

Our affect-attachment model is a more compelling explanation of the process by which people form their attitudes toward regime. To construct our model, we first operationalize the Saint-Germain-inspired independent variables of Exposure to Media, Confidence in Political Parties, and Political Efficacy. Exposure to Media is a measure of both political and cognitive awareness.⁴⁹ Our Exposure to Media variable combines the respondent's responses to three questions about three sources of news: television, radio, and newspaper. The Latinobarometer questions ask, "How many days did you watch (read or listen to) television news (or news in the newspaper or on the radio) in the last week?" We use factor analysis to find the commonality in the answers to these three questions and extract the first factor score. This measure ranges from -0.988 to 1.267 . We standardize the measure by subtracting the country survey-year mean value and dividing each value by the country survey-year standard deviation. This standardization makes the measure more comparable cross nationally. The resulting value is the Exposure to Media measure, which ranges from -2.3 to 2.5 . As the values are standardized and centered at zero, zero approximates middle-level awareness. We also generate the quadratic term Exposure to Media² to account for the curvilinear relationship between information and attitude toward regime.

The Confidence in Political Parties variable is used to model the relationship between individuals and the political party system. We use the Latinobarometer question, "How much confidence do you have in political parties?" The responses are "no confidence," "little confidence," "some confidence," and "much confidence." Confidence in Political Parties is an ordinal variable. We use Political Efficacy to model Saint-Germain's adaptation to new power structures factor. Using three survey questions that ask if the respondent 1) discusses politics, 2) attempts to convince someone on a political issue, and 3) takes a position of leadership in a group, we construct the Political Efficacy variable. The variable is a count of positive responses to the three questions and ranges from 0 to 3. We recode Political Efficacy as an ordinal variable with the values of 1 to 4.

Controlling for Alternative Explanations

As mentioned above, one possible explanation for the gender gap in support for democracy is that women's preferences are more strongly linked to the performance of the democratic regime than men's. We control for individual-level assessment of the performance of democracy with Satisfaction with Democracy (an assessment of the regime's overall performance) and Assessment of Economy (an assessment of the regime's economic performance). Satisfaction with Democracy has the following values: 1=not satisfied at all, 2=not very satisfied, 3=neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4=somewhat satisfied, 5=very satisfied. Assessment of Economy is the respondent's assessment of the current national economic situation and has the following values: 1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=about average, 4=good, 5=very good.

Other Controls for the Regime Preference Decision

We control for the effect of capitalist development with two variables, education and political ideology.⁵⁰

- 1) Education is measured in the following manner: 1=illiterate, 2=primary incomplete, 3=primary complete, 4=secondary incomplete, 5=secondary complete, 6=some college, 7=college degree.
- 2) Political Ideology, the 11-point ideology scale, is categorized in the following manner: 0 to 3=left, 4 to 6=center, 7 to 10=right, non response or no ideology=no ideology.

Last, we control for the age of respondent to account for time of political socialization. Age has the following values: 1=16 to 25, 2=26–40, 3=41–60, 4=61+.

Group-Level Control Variables

We also account for country-level (group) variables that may affect the attitude-toward-regime decision of women and men in Latin America. These controls account for the actual performance of the democratic regime in the areas of women's representation and gendered income inequality. We control for the percentage of Women in (national) Legislature for each country during the year of the survey. The values range from 2.5 percent for Paraguay in 1997 to 38.6 percent for Costa Rica in 2006. We account for gendered economic inequality with the variable Gender Income Inequality. We measure Gender Income Inequality by dividing the annual income of women by the annual income of men. The variable ranges in value from .24 in Ecuador in 1997 to .63 in Colombia in 2006. Finally, we include a set of dummy variables to account for the effect of the year of the survey on the regime preference decision.

Statistical Models

To test our analytical models, we generate predicted probabilities of democratic, authoritarian, and ambivalent regime preferences for Latin American women and men. We then plot these predicted probabilities by the three explanatory variables specified in our models. To generate these predicted probabilities, we subset our data by gender and run six logistic mixed-effect models to estimate the probability of a particular regime preference.⁵¹ Subsetting the data by gender accounts for the fact that we expect gender to interact with exposure to media, confidence in political parties, and political efficacy to influence attitude toward regime. We use a logistic multilevel mixed-effect regression model to analysis individual-level and country-level factors, covariates, and random effects that affect regime preference.⁵²

We enter Exposure to Media, Exposure to Media², Confidence in Political Parties, Political Efficacy, and the individual-level control variables on the first (individual) level of the multilevel model. The control variables are Satisfaction with Democracy, Assessment of the Economy, Political Ideology, Education, and Age. We enter the group-level control variables of percentage of Women in the Legislature and Gender Inequality on the second level of the model. Survey Year has a cross-level interaction effect and is entered on both levels of the model. Finally, we include Country as the random intercept effect.

Findings

Gender affects the process by which women and men make the attitude-toward-regime decision. Table 1 shows the results of the six logistic mixed-effect regressions. The first three models are democratic, authoritarian, and ambivalent for women; and the second three models are democratic, authoritarian, and ambivalent for men. We find that the three independent variables of interest (Exposure to Media, Confidence in Political Parties, and Political Efficacy) generally influence the attitude-toward-regime decision in the same manner, meaning that the nature of the relationship between the independent variables and the probability of a regime outcome is in the same direction and generally takes the same functional form (linear, monotonic, or curvilinear). This finding offers support for the idea that some of the difference in the regime preferences of women and men can be ascribed to differences in “affect” connection to the democratic state (the Separate Components Model). Moreover, Table 1 shows that Satisfaction with Democracy and Assessment of the Economy affect women and men’s regime preferences in the same manner (Satisfaction with Democracy coefficients are .230 and .234, respectively). In turn, there is little support for the performance-based alternative explanation.

Meanwhile, we find some support for our “Information,” “Party-based,” and “Political Efficacy” models of gendered attitude toward regime. Beginning with the Information Model, the effect of Exposure to Media on the probability of a democratic


Table 1 Logistic Mixed-Effects Models of Attitudes toward Regime

Parameter	Women	Women	Women	Men	Men	Men
	Democratic Estimate(se)	Authoritarian Estimate(se)	Ambivalent Estimate(se)	Democratic Estimate(se)	Authoritarian Estimate(se)	Ambivalent Estimate(se)
Individual-Level Effects						
Constant	-1.099(0.204)	-1.565(0.143)	0.530(0.150)	-0.622(0.128)	-1.609(0.140)	0.135(0.145)
Exposure to Media	0.073(0.012)	0.028(0.015)	-0.116(0.013)	0.092(0.012)	0.020(0.015)	-0.132(0.014)
Exposure Squared	-0.051(0.010)	-0.004(0.012)	0.061(0.011)	-0.032(0.010)	-0.021(0.012)	0.062(0.011)
Confidence in Parties	0.059(0.014)	0.020(0.018)	-0.093(0.016)	0.059(0.014)	-0.027(0.018)	-0.063(0.017)
Political Efficacy	0.007(0.019)	0.155(0.018)	-0.153(0.018)	-0.011(0.014)	0.148(0.017)	-0.124(0.016)
Individual-Level Controls						
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.230(0.009)	-0.111(0.012)	-0.221(0.011)	0.234(0.009)	-0.130(0.012)	-0.225(0.011)
Assessment of Economy	-0.008(0.015)	0.054(0.019)	-0.026(0.016)	-0.026(0.015)	0.047(0.019)	-0.006(0.018)
Survey Year						
1997	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
2000	-0.170(0.086)	0.036(0.113)	0.128(0.072)	-0.113(0.077)	0.135(0.111)	0.057(0.082)
2003	-0.463(0.071)	0.053(0.113)	0.338(0.124)	-0.236(0.071)	0.072(0.104)	0.257(0.103)
2006	-0.280(0.487)	0.076(0.067)	0.224(0.1110)	-0.127(0.069)	0.169(0.090)	0.140(0.096)
Political Ideology						
Right	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Center	0.083(0.030)	-0.066(0.037)	-0.040(0.035)	0.015(0.030)	-0.021(0.036)	0.020(0.036)
Left	-0.028(0.036)	0.034(0.044)	0.009(0.041)	-0.034(0.035)	-0.005(0.043)	0.083(0.041)
No Ideology	-0.140(0.033)	-0.390(0.044)	0.397(0.036)	-0.104(0.036)	-0.209(0.047)	0.296(0.041)
Education	0.167(0.007)	-0.238(0.009)	-0.190(0.008)	0.110(0.007)	-0.006(0.009)	-0.147(0.009)
Age	0.077(0.012)	-0.019(0.016)	-0.093(0.014)	0.092(0.012)	-0.009(0.015)	-0.124(0.015)
Variance Components						
Survey Year						
1997	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
2000	0.077[0.277]	0.206[0.454]	0.057[0.240]	0.077[0.277]	0.173[0.416]	0.079[0.281]
2003	0.061[0.247]	0.164[0.405]	0.229[0.479]	0.061[0.025]	0.154[0.392]	0.147[0.384]
2006	0.047[0.216]	0.041[0.203]	0.178[0.422]	0.047[0.216]	0.144[0.379]	0.131[0.361]
% of Women in Legislature	0.001[0.034]	0.003[0.052]	0.000[0.005]	0.000[0.012]	0.000[0.006]	0.000[0.001]
Gender Income Equality	0.002[0.040]	0.266[1.631]	0.074[0.272]	0.053[0.231]	0.616[0.785]	0.281[0.530]
Residual	0.689[0.830]	0.650[1.902]	0.201[0.449]	0.193[0.439]	0.121[0.347]	0.177[0.421]
REML Deviance						
-2 Loglikelihood	47365	32760	39282	45300	32216	35074
Number of Groups	-23683	-16380	-19641	-22650	-16108	-17537
Number of Observations	17	17	17	17	17	17
	37748	37748	37748	35911	35911	35911

Method of estimation Residual Maximum Likelihood. Generalized linear mixed-model fit using Laplace, Family=binomial. The link function is logistic. All models run in R using the lme4 package. Data source: Latinobarometer. Gender Income Inequality is taken from *United Nations Development Program Human Development Reports* 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. The measure divides women’s annual income by men annual income.

preference for both men and women is curvilinear. However, the effect of the Exposure to Media² on women’s probability of a democratic preference is stronger. To explain these relationships more fully, we plot the predicted probability of democratic, authoritarian, and ambivalent preference by Exposure to Media and Gender in Figure 1. Plot 1-1 of Figure 1 shows the predicted probability of a democratic preference for both women (the solid line) and men (the dashed line). Whereas men’s predicted probability of a democratic preference flattens at higher levels of Exposure to Media, women’s

Figure 1 Gendered Regime Preference in Latin America



probability of a democratic preference declines at higher levels of Exposure to Media. In contrast, Plot 1-2 of Figure 1 shows that Exposure to Media has little effect on the probability of an authoritarian attitude for both women (the solid-thin line) and men (the dashed-thin line). Furthermore, Plot 1-2 of Figure 1 shows that Exposure to Media has the same curvilinear but generally negative effect on the probability of an ambivalent regime attitude for both women (the solid-thick line) and men (the dashed-thick line). Plot 1-2 also shows that women with high exposure to media are significantly more likely to be ambivalent about regime than men.

Gender differences in the effects of Confidence in Political Parties and on the attitude-toward-regime decision are most evident as these two independent variables relate to the “ambivalent” choice. Plots 1-4 and 1-6 of Figure 1 show these relationships. The thick lines in Plot 1-4 show that women (the solid line) with no confidence in political parties ($p = .30$) are far more likely to be ambivalent about the regime than men (the dashed line) with no confidence in political parties ($p = .24$). Yet when women express high confidence in political parties, their predicted probability of an ambivalent regime preference ($p = .18$) is closer to that of men who express high confidence in political parties ($p = .16$). Similarly, the thick lines in Plot 1-6 show that women (the solid line) with no political efficacy ($p = .30$) are far more likely to be ambivalent about regime than men (the dashed line) with no political efficacy ($p = .24$). When women have high political efficacy, their predicted probability of an ambivalent regime preference ($p = .16$) is closer to that of men who have high political efficacy ($p = .15$). The absence of confidence in political parties and political efficacy results in higher ambivalence for women relative to their male counterparts, whereas high levels of confidence in political parties and political efficacy results in like probabilities for women and men.

Democratic Transition and Gendered Attitude toward Regime

Saint-Germain posits that women's level of participation in the democratic transition affects the subsequent attitudes that women have about the new regime.⁵³ We now turn to explicitly address participation in the historical moment of democratic transition. Specifically, we analyze women's participation levels during transition in conjunction with varying post-transition information and mobilization levels and discern their consequent effects on attitude formation.

There is no universal measure of women's participation levels in democratic transitions. We use Terry Lynn Karl's categorization scheme of democratic transition to help us assess the relative capacity of women as a group to participate as a meaningful political actor in Latin American democratic transitions.⁵⁴ Karl categorizes the democratic transitions of Latin American countries by two conditions: 1) relative strength of political actors, and 2) strategies for transition.⁵⁵ She relates the relative strength of political actors to the degree to which elite or mass actors play the principal role in the democratic transition. In essence, this is a measure of the amount of space available to women as significant political actors at the time of the democratic transition. At the extreme ends of this spatial dimension, either strong elite actors or previously marginalized mass actors control the strategies of democratic transition. The strategies of transition involve either compromise or force.⁵⁶ Karl proposes a two-by-two configuration that specifies four modes of democratic transition (imposition, pact, reform, and revolution) and applies this configuration to Latin American countries. Table 2 shows our adoption and expansion of Karl's categorization.⁵⁷

First, in democracies that transitioned by imposition, we expect women to have less connection to the new democratic state. While elite actors dominate in both pact and imposition modes of transition, subordinate class actors (like women's groups) generally have a marginalized role in regime transitions that occur by imposition. Therefore, because women's voices and interests were relatively absent at the founding of these new regimes, we expect women to have low affect for the resulting democratic regime and interpret information about the new democratic regime differently than men (cell 1,2).

Next, we expect women in countries that transitioned to democracy by foundational pacts to have higher affect for the resulting democratic regime than women who reside in imposition countries. Karl argues that foundational pacts involve a series of agreements, emphasizing "bargaining about bargaining," and inclusion of virtually all politically significant actors.⁵⁸ She concludes that "collusive multi-party" competition plays the principal role in the stability of democratic transition in pact countries. Such conditions imply that women are likely to be among the significant actors included in the process, particularly during late third wave democracies. Given the central role of political parties in bargaining processes, women's relationships with political parties are particularly important in the connection that women have to the democracy, making Confidence in Political Parties the key variable here. Although we expect women in pact countries to have high affect for democracy, their affect connection to the new democracy

Table 2 Modes of Democratic Transition and Gendered Attitude Development

Relative Strength of Actors	Strategies of Transition	
	Compromise	Force
Elite Ascendant	(1,1) Pact High Affect but less Than male counterparts (Party-centered) Costa Rica [1948] Colombia [1958] Venezuela [1958] Uruguay [1984] Brazil [1985] Chile [1988] Paraguay [1989] Panama [1989]	(1,2) Imposition Low Affect (Information-centered) Ecuador [1976] Peru [1978] Bolivia [1982] Honduras [1982] Guatemala [1984(1996)]
Mass Ascendant	(2,1) Reform Highest Affect equal to Male counterparts (Society-centered) Argentina [1983] El Salvador [1992]	(2,2) Revolution Low Affect for Democracy (Some Affect for the State) Mexico[(1910–1917)(1997)] Nicaragua[(1979)(1990)]

[Year]=year of democratic transition. These years of transition data are generally taken from Karl (1990) and Linz and Stepan (1996). For Mexico and Nicaragua the years in parentheses are the years of the social revolutions.

is likely to be less than men’s because traditional elites continue to dominate the political process (cell 1,1).⁵⁹

In revolutionary-transition countries, we expect women to have lower affect for the new democratic regime. Women are often mobilized by the revolutionary party that dominates the state.⁶⁰ This means many women, who organize for the purpose of advancing their interests as women, have strong links to the revolutionary state. This revolutionary state is not initially democratic but often produces “stable forms of governance.”⁶¹ After social revolution, both Mexico and Nicaragua transitioned to democracy through electoral rules and multiparty competition.⁶² Because revolutionary states mobilize women, many women (and subordinate class citizens in general) likely have some residual connection to the remnants of the revolutionary state apparatus, and this, therefore, results in lower affect connection to the new democratic state (cell 2,2).⁶³

Finally, we expect women and men in reform-transition democracies to have the highest affect connection to the new democracy. Women in this type of democracy are most likely to have views about democracy that are similar to men’s because of the expanded political space offered to women and other subordinate class groups


during transition. This is indicated by “competitive-multiparty” electoral competition instilled during transition.⁶⁴ While Karl argues that reform democracies are likely to be more politically fragile than other transition types because the previous dominant class must now share power with rising mass actors, women are likely to find greater political space in which to advance their political interests. Moreover, policy gains made by women are a result of women effectively organizing their interests through both autonomous movements and political parties.⁶⁵ In short, women’s success in reform countries is more society-centered than party-centered, and as a consequence, women’s affect connection is likely to be most similar to that of their male counterparts. Said differently, this orientation toward a strong women’s voice in civil society in reform transition states is what largely sets this women’s affect connection apart from those formulated by pact, imposition, and revolutionary transitions (cell 2,1).

Empirical Findings

To test the contentions stated above, we subset the predicted probabilities for a democratic preference by mode of democratic transition and plot these probabilities by Exposure to Media, Confidence in Political Parties, and Political Efficacy.⁶⁶ Figure 2 plots women’s democratic probabilities on the left side and men’s probabilities on the right side. The regression lines for the different modes of transition have the following line types: imposition=solid; pact=dashed; reform=dotted; revolution=dashed-dotted.

Our expectations concerning reform countries are correct. There is sufficient evidence that of all transition modes women in reform countries are most likely to offer support for democracy. This is also true for men. The democratic probability patterns of

Figure 2 Gendered Regime Preference by Mode of Democratic Transition



women are most like those of their male counterparts. For instance, Plots 2-1 and 2-2 of Figure 2 show that women and men in reform countries react similarly to Exposure to Media. Also, women in reform countries with higher levels of exposure to media are the only set of women with high levels of information that have the same probability of expressing a democratic preference as their male counterparts.

Conversely, the largest discrepancy between women and men in their level of support for democracy occurs in imposition countries (Plots 2-1 and 2-2, the solid and dashed lines, respectively); and, as the plots reveal, women and men of these countries are most different in their reaction to Exposure to Media in formulating that attitude. Each gender exhibits unique probability patterns of democratic preference. The democratic preference probability of men in imposition countries increases at a decreasing rate as Exposure to Media increases. Conversely, the democratic preference probability of women in imposition countries begins to decline at an Exposure to Media value of 1. In short, women and men in imposition-transition countries react differently, particularly when exposed to high levels of information.

While revolutionary-transition countries (like imposition countries) also have lower probabilities of favoring democracy, Plots 2-5 and 2-6 show that the pattern of democratic preference formation in revolutionary countries differs from that of imposition countries. Because the prior revolutionary state fostered a relationship with organized women, many women maintain affect connection to the state.⁶⁷ Plot 2-5 shows that women in revolutionary states with high efficacy (the solid line) are significantly more likely to express a democratic preference than high efficacy women in imposition countries. Plot 2-6 shows that the predicted probability of a democratic preference of highly efficacious men in these two types of countries also diverge, but the divergence is more pronounced among women in the two types of countries. What makes the divergent effect of efficacy on democratic preference probabilities in revolutionary and imposition countries particularly noteworthy is that these countries typically have effect patterns that are quite similar (see Plots 2-3 and 2-4).

Finally, our findings demonstrate the important role that political parties play in the gendered formation of attitude toward regime in “pact” countries. Plots 2-3 and 2-4 show that women and men in pact democracies with “much=4” confidence in political parties express a preference for democracy at the same levels as women and men in reform democracies. This shows that political parties play a greater role in formulating attitudes of those who reside in countries that transitioned by foundational pact as opposed to individuals who reside in countries that transitioned by reform.

Furthermore, pact countries include Uruguay and Chile (the most successful third wave democracies) and Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela (the three oldest electoral democracies in Latin America). Nonetheless, women in reform countries (Argentina and El Salvador) are significantly more likely to express a preference for democracy than women in pact countries (with the exception of pact democracy citizens with high confidence in political parties). Omar Encarnación points out that political pacts in South America “were designed to exclude the [political] left and its allies from power.”⁶⁸ Because women’s groups were initially aligned with the political

left, reform democracies are more inclusive of women's interests. This greater inclusion is reflected in a higher probability of a preference for democracy among women in reform democracies.

Conclusion

A gendered analysis of the democratization process must begin by examining the terms of transition, as Waylen suggests.⁶⁹ Post-transition gendered attitudes toward democracy are partly a function of the mode of transition by which a country comes to democracy. Thus, we find that 1) Latin American women are not more likely than men to base their regime preference on the performance of the regime, and 2) the greater tendency of Latin American women to abandon democracy is not due to fear of democratic uncertainty.

Women who reside in countries that experience transition by reform vary in their support of democracy in ways that are similar to their male counterparts. On the other hand, when women and men reside in countries that transitioned to democracy by imposition, their behavior becomes gender specific. Compared to their male counterparts, women of "imposition" selectively resist, so to speak, when they are exposed to a high degree of information about the regime. Recall that transition by reform brings mass actors more fully into political society by way of compromise, whereas transition by imposition brings a smaller set of political actors into power. Because imposition comes by way of coercion and affords women less political space, women have less reason to possess a high affinity for the resulting democratic regime relative to their male counterparts. Alternatively, compromise and broadened political space inspire a deeper and denser connection in women that is much like their male counterparts.

Countries of revolution and imposition transition types come to democracy by way of force; consequently, they typically have similar effect patterns. Yet there is one notable exception. Highly efficacious women of revolutionary countries are significantly more likely to express democratic support than highly efficacious women of imposition countries. We attribute this to the fact that the revolutionary state generally fosters more of a relationship with organized women during transition than the imposition state.

Third, surprisingly, even though a woman may live in a democracy that is considered to be more successful, she is not necessarily more likely to support democracy. In fact, she is less likely to support democracy if she resides in a country that transitioned to democracy by way of pact instead of reform. Pact countries are less inclusive of women during transition than reform countries and, as a consequence, women in pact countries have comparably lower democratic preference probabilities. Again, there is one exception. Only when women and men experience a pact transition, and continue to maintain high confidence in political parties, do they come to express a preference for democracy at levels equal to their counterparts in reform countries.

We use Waylen's "terms-of-transition" logic with great success in the second stage of our two-stage analysis of the gendered attitude-toward-regime choice in Latin

America. Our findings validate the arguments of Saint-Germain and Karl. Linking these arguments yields new and important insights into the effects of democratic transition types on subsequent attitudes about democracy. Specifically, the type of democratic transition directs the particular processes by which attitudes are formed and, as result, how democracy is perceived in post-transition countries.

NOTES

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40. Age is an important variable that is used to account for cohort effects, without which we cannot control for age-socialization effects. We dropped 839 respondents (445 women and 394 men) from a total of 74,498 respondents (1.1 percent).

41. For more technical information, see <http://www.latinobarometro.org>.

42. Juan Linz introduced this survey question in the 1970s.

43. Country-level democratic preference percentages are: Argentina=71.7; Bolivia=60.0; Brazil=42.3; Chile=56.3; Colombia=55.6; Costa Rica=79.5; Ecuador=48.7; El Salvador=56.6; Guatemala=43.0; Honduras=57.3; Mexico=50.9; Nicaragua=59.5; Panama=59.9; Paraguay=43.9; Peru=57.2; Uruguay=81.6; Venezuela=66.3. Data Source: 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006 Latinobarometer Survey. A table of descriptive statistics by country and gender can be found at <http://people.cas.sc.edu/walker/d>.

44. Country-level authoritarian preference percentages are: Argentina=16.2; Bolivia=17.9; Brazil=20.0; Chile=15.9; Colombia=16.8; Costa Rica=7.6; Ecuador=22.5; El Salvador=12.5; Guatemala=23.1; Honduras=15.0; Mexico=23.6; Nicaragua=12.4; Panama=16.3; Paraguay=36.1; Peru=17.4; Uruguay=8.5; Venezuela=16.9. Data Source: 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006 Latinobarometer Survey.

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65. Saint-Germain; Kampwirth 1998; Waylen 2000.
66. We subset the predicted probabilities of a democratic preference and analyze the data graphically. Observed differences that result from this approach more explicitly examine the null hypothesis of no difference.
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